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While walking down their street one evening, Marcus and Alfred, both 
eighteen, passed a boy they recognized from school.  Marcus approached the 
boy, and in a low, menacing voice, he demanded the boy’s backpack.  After 
rummaging through the pack, Marcus pulled out forty dollars, shoved the boy 
down, and walked off.  Alfred, surprised as he stood by watching, pulled the 
boy to his feet and then walked away in the same direction as Marcus.  
The police later arrested both Marcus and Alfred, and the prosecutor charged 
them with robbery1 and street terrorism.2  Although Alfred did not actively 
participate in this event, the prosecutor charged him under the accomplice 
                                                        
 + Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.  He thanks Pepperdine University School of 
Law’s Summer Research Grant Fund, and his research assistants: Natalia Bronchuk, Lauren 
Wilson Castles, Chalak Richards, and Zach Ulrich, as well as Reference Librarian Jennifer 
Allison. 
 1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 2008) (“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal 
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”). 
 2. The California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act provides, in part, that 
[A]ny person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction 
of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, 
further or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members . . . shall be punished by 
imprisonment . . . . 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
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theory of criminal liability, for which he could face up to sixteen years in 
prison.3   
Days later, dressed in a jail-issued, orange jumpsuit and seated in the secure 
“custody box,” Alfred watched as his court-appointed attorney discussed his 
case with the prosecutor.  When the attorneys finished, Alfred’s counsel 
relayed to him the prosecutor’s so-called one-time offer: “If you plead to the 
robbery charge, the street terrorism charge will be dropped, and you will serve 
two years in state prison.”  
Counseling him on this offer, Alfred’s attorney adamantly urged Alfred to 
reject this deal and take his case to trial.  His attorney promptly expressed his 
belief that if the case did go to trial, Alfred would be acquitted.  He maintained 
that Alfred was only in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong 
person. 
Thus, Alfred faced a tragically difficult choice: either plead to the felony and 
take the two years in prison for a crime he did not commit, or risk spending the 
next decade and a half of his life in state prison. 
Alfred’s Kafkaesque choice is not uncommon;4 such nightmarish scenarios 
play out every day in courts across the country.5  The vast discrepancy between 
the offered disposition and the potential punishment for a conviction at trial 
can often lead to coerced pleas.6  Those vulnerable to coerced pleas include the 
innocent and the guilty, if the guilty face charges beyond their actual criminal 
conduct.7  
The criminal charging process is, of course, an essential component of the 
criminal justice system.8  As the Supreme Court stated, plea-bargaining is 
“inherent in the criminal law and its administration.”9  Some American  
justice-system scholars maintain that court systems would buckle under 
weighty caseloads if attorneys were unable to reach agreements in the vast 
                                                        
 3. Id. § 213(a)(1)(B) (providing for up to six years of imprisonment for first-degree 
robbery); see also id. § 186.22(1)(C) (adding ten years to the sentence of a gang member 
convicted of a violent felony, including robbery, under certain circumstances). 
 4. See generally FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) 
(1925) (telling the story of a man who was arrested and ultimately executed for  a crime he did 
not commit). 
 5. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2008) (noting the rising number of innocent defendants entering 
guilty pleas to avoid risky trials). 
 6. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 863 (1995) 
(discussing how prosecutors regularly use their discretion in the charging process to influence 
defendants to plead guilty). 
 8. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 9. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970). 
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majority of their cases.10  Consequently, negotiating dispositions has become 
the norm.11  However, for the plea-bargaining process to serve the public 
fairly, it must be implemented with careful discretion, particularly when 
evaluating who should be charged and what should be charged, to fairly and 
accurately reflect the criminal conduct involved.12  If compromised, the 
potential for injustice and the specter of coercive plea bargaining move front 
and center.13    
In implementing the plea-bargaining process, the state, as the prosecutor of 
crimes, has a powerful incentive to begin the inevitable negotiating process 
from a position of strength, which often results in overcharging.14  Yet 
                                                        
 10. See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000) 
(“Prosecutors of the nineteenth century, like prosecutors today, plea bargained to ease their 
crushing workloads, made heavier in the nineteenth century both by their part-time status and 
utter lack of staff and by a caseload explosion perhaps set off by newly founded police forces and 
massive immigration.”); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating 
that plea bargains “serve an important role in the disposition of today’s heavy calendars”).    But 
see Kirk Makin, Top Jurist Urges Review of ‘Coercive’ Plea Bargaining System, GLOBE & MAIL,  
Mar. 8, 2011, at A14, available at 2011 WLNR 4491398 (“[O]ne U.S. jurisdiction—New 
Orleans—banned plea bargaining several years ago, yet many people continued to plead guilty 
and there was no sharp increase in trials.”). 
 11. See Univ. of Albany, Table 5.22.2010: Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District 
Courts, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST., http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK] (providing the total number of criminal 
defendants, convicted defendants, and defendants convicted by a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendre).  Of the 98,311 total criminal defendants disposed of by U.S. district courts in 2010, 
89,741 were convicted, and 87,418 (or ninety-seven percent) of those convictions were obtained 
through a plea.  Id.; see also 1A CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 180 (4th ed. 2008) (“In a typical year roughly 85% of the federal 
criminal cases filed end in a guilty plea.”). 
 12. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 32 (2002). 
 13. See Meares, supra note 7, at 866 (noting that “vast prosecutorial discretion at the 
charging stage” can impinge on a defendant’s free will to choose whether or not to plead guilty to 
the proposed charges).  This discretion can be attributed to the “natural gap” between the proof 
required to bring a charge and the proof required to obtain a conviction at trial.  Id. at 865.  A 
prosecutor may bring a charge so long as there is probable cause, which also may be based on 
evidence otherwise inadmissible at trial, whereas a conviction at trial would require proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt in strict compliance with the rules of evidence.  Id. at 865–66. 
 14. See Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 33.  Any attempt to ascertain how widespread 
overcharging has become is destined to be only the roughest of estimates.  Prosecutorial agencies 
still fail to acknowledge that such practices even exist, and even in a candid moment, they would 
not have an incentive to report such practices.  See id. at 34 (describing the plea-bargaining 
process as “not open for review or evaluation”).  As a result, efforts to quantify the  
negotiated-disposition practice are relegated to review of the prevailing opinions given by 
American justice-system scholars, which, in most instances, draw on largely anecdotal evidence.  
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2547 (2004) (“[P]lea bargaining hides within a low-visibility process . . . . A few 
researchers have been able to observe bargaining or to review prosecutor’s files, but by and large 
attorneys are reluctant to let outsiders into the plea-bargaining process.”); Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff, Note, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
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whenever a prosecutorial agency files charges that are disproportionate or 
misrepresentative of the defendant’s actions, that agency runs afoul of the 
ethical guidelines governing prosecutors,15 abuses its prosecutorial power,16 
and compromises the justice system as a whole.  
However, identifying the shortcomings of the plea-bargaining power is less 
problematic than actually discovering sensible and workable solutions to those 
problems.  Most would agree that coercive plea or sentencing bargaining is 
wrong.  The rub, of course, is fixing the problem.  With that ambitious and 
perhaps elusive goal in mind, this Article offers an approach to reduce, if not 
eradicate, coercive plea and sentence bargaining.  
Part I of this Article briefly sets forth the ethical and professional duties of 
prosecutors.  Part II examines the game-theory concepts at play in plea- and 
sentence-bargaining negotiations.  For perspective, Part III explores the 
evolution of plea bargaining from common law and elucidates the problem of 
coercive plea bargaining.  Part VI analyzes how other scholars’ approaches fail 
to address the problem adequately and hence have not been implemented.  
Finally, in Part V, the Article concludes by offering a viable approach for 
limiting prosecutorial abuse in the charging process—an approach that 
governments, both state and federal, can implement without disrupting the 
justice system and without significant costs.   
I.  ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL DUTIES OF PROSECUTORS  
The prosecutor, a representative of the state,17 serves as the public’s 
“minister of justice,” thereby distinguishing the prosecutorial role from that of 
simple advocacy.18  The Supreme Court once described the prosecutor as “in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. . . . It is as much his 
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”19    
Thus, although governed by the same ethical rules as other attorneys, 
prosecutors are also subject to additional ethical standards.  For example, 
                                                                                                                                
115, 116 n.5 (1997) (noting that the author’s data was gathered “from personal interviews with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys” and that the author had to “maintain interview subjects’ 
anonymity so that they could speak freely”). 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2470 (“Apart from [certain deterrence considerations], plea 
bargains should depend only on the severity of the crime, the strength of the evidence, and the 
defendant’s record and need for punishment.  This ideal asks prosecutors to be perfectly selfless, 
perfectly faithful agents of the public interest.”); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining 
as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1991 (1992) (“[A]gency problems . . . pose massive obstacles to 
efficient, welfare-enhancing transactions. Prosecutors have few incentives to pursue an optimal 
deterrence strategy . . . .”). 
 17. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980). 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 19. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8, which specifically addresses the 
“special responsibilities” of prosecutors, instructs prosecutors to bring only 
those charges supported by probable cause,20 which is commonly defined as a 
“reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed . . . a crime.”21  In 
other words, if the case proceeds to trial, then the evidence must reasonably 
support the number and degree of the filed charges.22  This fundamental 
prosecutorial obligation is rooted in the underlying goal of the criminal justice 
system—to convict and punish only the guilty and to avoid a wrongful 
conviction or punishment of the innocent.23   
II.  PLEA BARGAINING THROUGH THE LENS OF GAME THEORY 
Recognizing that a prosecutor’s professional and ethical responsibilities 
extend to both the filing of charges and the case-disposition process, this 
Article examines these interrelated functions under the lens of game theory.  
As the phrase itself suggests, plea bargaining is a negotiation between 
opposing parties, with each attempting to “win” the negotiating battle.24  
However, “winning” in this context is not entirely a function of whether the 
prosecutor obtained a plea to the crimes charged or a lengthy sentence, or 
whether the defense obtained a plea to a significantly lesser charge or a 
minimal sentence.  Rather, winning and losing in the serious business of plea 
bargaining is often defined by the parties’ respective motivations and 
expectations.25   
Game theory, an analytical tool often used in the field of economics to 
analyze the motivations of individual actors in various situations,26 may help 
                                                        
 20. Id.; see also Mari Bryne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1962, 2976–77 (2010) (noting that this standard is the requisite minimum and describing 
arguments made in favor of a higher standard). 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  1321 (9th ed. 2009). 
 22. Byrne, supra note 20, at 2975 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.9(f) (3d ed. 1993)). 
 23. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Standard 3-1.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (“Although the prosecutor operates within the 
adversary system, it is fundamental that the prosecutor’s obligation is to protect the innocent as 
well as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of 
the public.”). 
 24. See Rudolph J. Gerber, A System in Collapse: Appearance vs. Reality in Criminal 
Justice, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 225, 226 (1993) (“For sophisticated defense attorneys and 
defendants, this culture of overcharging means that the charges don’t really mean what they say 
but merely constitute a first bargaining position. Experienced defense counsel recognize 
bargaining as a poker game of bluff and intimidation.”). 
 25. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1132 
(1998) (“The prosecutor is charged with achieving a result that satisfies society’s sometimes 
conflicting desires for vengeance, deterrence, and fairness.  The defendant seeks to minimized 
incarceration, loss of reputation, and damage to his personal affairs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 26. COLIN F. CRAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY 2–3 (2003). 
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elucidate the delicate intricacies of plea and sentence bargaining.27  In this 
context, game theory identifies the incentives and motivations of prosecutors 
and defendants throughout the stages of the plea-bargaining process, ranging 
from the filing of charges to acceptance or referral of prosecutors’ final 
offers.28  The following analysis synthesizes past explorations of plea 
bargaining using the game theory, thereby demonstrating a prosecutor’s 
individual and institutional motivations to overcharge defendants.  
The prosecutor’s and defendant’s behavior throughout any given  
plea-bargaining process are, in many ways, mutually dependent.29  When 
deciding which charges to file and which plea offers to make, the prosecutor 
considers how the defendant will respond to his or her decisions; the 
defendant’s response is therefore a crucial factor in the prosecutor’s decision-
making process.30  Similarly, when deciding whether to accept or reject a plea 
offer, the defendant also considers the crucial factor of how the prosecutor will 
react to his or her response.31  Because each party’s actions are substantially 
dependent upon the anticipated actions of the other, their motivations are 
fundamentally related.  Furthermore, because these mutually exclusive 
motivations can be quantified, one can generally approximate the actions of 
prosecutors and defendants on a greater scale.32   
                                                        
 27. Cf. Charles F. Manski, Economic Analysis of Social Interactions, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 2000, at 115, 116 (“Game theory encouraged economists to see all interactions as games, 
with markets as special cases.  As a result, economic theorists have in recent years studied 
phenomena as far from traditional economic concerns as the evolution of social norms.”). 
 28. See infra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Stephen F. Ross, Note, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuses in 
Plea Bargaining, 66 CAL. L. REV. 875, 883 (describing this mutual dependence as a “mutuality of 
advantage”).  Stephen Ross states: 
Since plea bargaining derives its constitutional legitimacy from the “mutuality of 
advantage” enjoyed by the prosecutor and the defendant, only a plea bargain that 
involves a real benefit in the form of lenient treatment to the defendant as well as 
administrative convenience to the government keeps the element of coercion within 
constitutional limits. 
Id. 
 30. See CRAMERER, supra note 26, at 2 (“In [game theory] situations, a person (or firm) 
must anticipate what others will do and what others will infer from the person’s own actions.”); 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60 (1968) 
(“When a prosecutor has a dead-bang case, he is likely to come up with an impossible offer like 
thirty to fifty years.  When the case has a hole in it, however, the prosecutor may scale the offer 
all the way down to probation.  The prosecutors’ [sic] goal is to get something from every 
defendant . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31. Scott A. Baker, Essays in Game Theory and the Law 2 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at http://proquest.umi.com. 
 32. See Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1132 (comparing the factors motivating prosecutors and 
defendants); infra notes 33–40; see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2470–77 (discussing the various 
incentives of prosecutors and defense counsel).  Professor Stephanos Bibas discusses prosecutors’ 
incentives, stating: 
The strength of the prosecution’s case is the most important factor, but other 
considerations come into play.  Trials are much more time consuming than plea 
2011] Coercive Plea Bargaining 69 
To illustrate, a defendant will accept a plea offer only if the utility (or value) 
of the known consequences of such an acceptance outweighs the risk (or cost) 
associated with going to trial.33  In using this equation, one must first assess the 
many variables involved in the plea-bargaining process.34  One such variable is 
the defendant’s wealth.35  Particularly, this variable measures the defendant’s 
ability to retain private counsel, rather than being forced to rely on  
court-appointed counsel for financial reasons.36  Although retaining private 
counsel certainly increases costs, it simultaneously lessens the overall risk of 
going to trial, because a more capable and willing advocate increases the 
likelihood of a favorable outcome.37  Notwithstanding this potential advantage, 
defendants who opt to go to trial must still incur the heightened transaction 
costs associated with this option.38  
Another variable involved in the equation is the minimum sentence that the 
prosecutor is willing to offer.  Monetary losses, such as lost income, lost work 
experience, and lost job seniority while imprisoned, are compounded by  
non-monetary losses, such as time away from family and friends, association 
                                                                                                                                
bargains, so prosecutors have incentives to negotiate deals instead of trying cases.  
Prosecutors have personal incentives to reduce their workloads so that they can leave 
work early enough to dine with their families.  Additionally, prosecutors are paid 
salaries, not by case or by outcome, so they have no direct financial stake in the 
outcome. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Bibas also explains that busy district attorney’s offices are likely to offer 
more favorable pleas to defendants than offices with lighter caseloads.  Id. at 2474.  Similarly, 
defendants and their counsel have individual motivations.  See id. at 2477.  Bibas explains that: 
Though not all lawyers are slaves to their pocketbooks, financial incentives influence 
many to varying degrees.  A lawyer who receives a fixed salary or a flat fee per case 
has no financial incentive to try cases.  On the contrary, flat fees create financial 
incentives to plead cases out quickly in order to handle larger volumes. . . . To put it 
bluntly, appointed or flat-fee defense lawyers can make more money with less time and 
effort by pushing clients to plead. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 33. See Douglas D. Guldorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The 
Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 771–72 (1998) (“The harsh 
penalties associated with conviction at trial provide the prosecutor with significant leverage to 
persuade defendants to plead guilty.  In some cases, this may result in innocent defendants being 
faced with a choice where the cost of pleading guilty outweighs the risk of going to trial.  Risk-
averse defendants will accept the state’s offer and plead guilty.”). 
 34. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2476 (identifying a defendant’s wealth as a variable). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 2476–77 (discussing the financial pressures and incentives associated with 
different types of defense attorneys).  Bibas suggests that a defense attorney is more likely to 
litigate, rather than aim for a quick plea bargain, when there is a promise of continued hourly 
payment.  See id. 
 38. See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation 
of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557, 558 (1986) (“Using the court to resolve the dispute is 
costly for both the defendant and the plaintiff (in terms of time, legal fees, etc.) and may be 
subject to error.”). 
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with other incarcerated individuals, and the stigma of jail or prison time.39  Of 
course, a defendant who chooses to go to trial may well face the same losses, 
or worse, should he not prevail. 
In sum, the equation reads: A plea bargain occurs if the value of the plea, 
less the costs associated with transacting the plea bargain and serving the 
offered sentence, is worth more to the defendant than what he or she might 
gain at trial.40  This equation is not intended to provide a definitive guide to 
each party’s motivations during plea bargaining; rather, it is intended to 
provide an example of ways in which party motivations may be quantified and 
analyzed, thereby serving as the basis of policy recommendations.  
One of the equation’s obvious limitations is its assumption that both parties 
know every fact involved and every piece of information that the other party 
has, including the verdict should the case proceed to trial.41  Absent this 
assumed omniscience, both parties face increased risk in any decision they 
make.42  For example, a defendant may not be able to ascertain whether the 
prosecutor will actually take his or her case to trial without making any further 
offers.  If the defendant believes that the prosecutor is bluffing in making a 
“final offer,” then the defendant might be motivated to reject the offer, which 
he or she otherwise might have accepted if the offer was truly thought to be 
final.  However, the defendant takes on significant risk when rejecting an offer, 
given his or her inability to predict the prosecutor’s future conduct with any 
certainty.  This asymmetry of information—where one or both sides have 
information that the other cannot—makes the “game” of plea bargaining a 
gamble for both sides.43  
The asymmetry of information inherent in plea bargaining significantly 
increases the chance of sub-optimal outcomes when compared to cases 
                                                        
 39. See Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1132 (discussing the factors considered by defendants 
facing potential imprisonment).  Former Professor Fred Zacharias also recognizes that most 
defendants “seek[] to minimize incarceration, loss of reputation, and damage to his personal 
affairs.”  Id. 
 40. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2008) 
(recognizing that “the costs of proceeding to trial often swamp the costs of pleading to lenient 
bargains”). 
 41. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1130–31 (explaining the inaccessibility of information 
in the criminal-negotiation context). 
 42. Cf. Urs Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information, 
56 REV. ECON. STUD. 163, 163 (1989) (“It seems to be a basic tenet of the economic analysis of 
law that voluntary exchange and transaction enhance efficiency.”).  Dr. Urs Schweizer further 
explains that “decisions based on unqualified judgement [sic] and faulty views can lead to 
litigation and, in fact, may actually do so quite frequently in real life.”  Id. at 164; see also Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 
404 (1984) (“[I]nformational asymmetry influences parties’ decisions, and . . . might lead to 
parties’ failure to settle.”). 
 43. Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 749, 749–50 (1983). 
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involving omniscient parties.44  For instance, it is valuable for a prosecutor to 
know that a defendant will agree to a plea bargain for a three-year prison term 
but not a four-year prison term.  If the prosecutor knows this information, he or 
she can more precisely calibrate the plea offer to balance his or her own 
competing interests of allocating limited resources to trial only when necessary 
and seeking justice for the public by only offering plea bargains when 
appropriate.45  If a prosecutor is able to anticipate the maximum number of 
years obtainable in a given plea bargain, then he or she can more efficiently 
balance these competing needs.  
Past game-theory analyses of plea bargaining view the “game” as merely a 
balancing of economic resources by the prosecutor and the defendant,46 but 
later analyses extend such previous works to include the game’s efficiency as a 
socially beneficial vetting tool.47  Previous analyses suggest that plea 
bargaining may not necessarily lead to the optimal, just outcomes that it seeks 
to achieve.48  For instance, game theory shows that prosecutors need to be 
credible when threatening to pursue trial for defendants to fear conviction and 
thus take plea offers.49  On the other hand, game theory also shows that 
prosecutors would violate their ethical duty of seeking justice for the public if 
they pursue trial when they know a given defendant is innocent.50  Prosecutors, 
as agents of the state, seek to promote judicial economy by only trying those 
cases they are likely to win;51 however, short of open admissions of guilt, 
prosecutors may not ever truly know whether a given defendant is guilty or 
innocent.  
                                                        
 44. See, e.g., id. at 752–56.  Professors Gene Grossman and Michael Katz created an 
analytical model of the plea-bargaining process and concluded that the process loses utility when 
a prosecutor is not certain of the defendant’s guilt or innocence and defendants are not equally 
risk averse.  Id.  They compare this result to a hypothetical model, assuming all defendants are 
guilty, in which plea bargaining would “achieve a level of social welfare greater than that 
attainable through trial.”  See id. 
 45. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2470–71, 2479. 
 46. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 43, at 749; see, e.g., William Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 63–67 (1971) (analyzing plea bargaining almost 
exclusively as a balancing of parties’ marginal utility against the resources available to them). 
 47. See, e.g., Grossman & Katz, supra note 43, at 749–50. 
 48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Guldorizzi, supra note 33, at 771 
(“The most serious concern with plea bargaining pertains to the possible coercion of innocent 
defendants to plead guilty.”). 
 49. See Joseph W. Vanover, Comment, Utilitarian Analysis of the Objectives of Criminal 
Plea Negotiation and Negotiation Strategy Choice, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 183, 192 (“If a 
prosecutor makes a habit of overcharging and always dismissing charges to reach plea agreements 
then word will get out. Once it becomes known that the prosecutor always overcharges, defense 
lawyers will treat the originally filed charges lightly and thus undermine the prosecutor’s 
negotiating position.”). 
 50. Grossman & Katz, supra note 43, at 753 (noting that the interests of defendants and the 
State should align when the defendants are innocent). 
 51. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2470. 
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Because prosecutors must make credible threats to prosecute defendants 
effectively,52 and because prosecutors may not always know whether 
defendants are guilty, they cannot always be certain whether they are able to 
go to trial, especially before discovery, without violating their heightened 
ethical obligations as prosecutors.53  Therefore, prosecutors’ threats, in 
practice, may not always be credible.  Thus, defendants are incentivized to turn 
down plea offers, especially the initial offer, and particularly if they are 
innocent.54   
Game theory also sheds light on prosecutors’ incentives and motivations in 
charging, or potentially overcharging, defendants to gain leverage in the plea-
bargaining process.  Prosecutors are inherently motivated to have as many 
guilty defendants convicted as possible and to have convicted defendants serve 
lengthy sentences.55  To illustrate, when a defendant commits a crime, society 
can be thought of as charging him the price of committing that crime.56  
Because prosecutors have limited time and monetary resources, they seek to 
utilize their time and resources to maximize the price paid by defendants 
overall.57  Using this logic, a prosecutor who is confident in a defendant’s guilt 
would go forward with a plea deal, as opposed to bringing the defendant to 
trial, only when confronted with limited availability of resources and the need 
to use such resources efficiently.58  Therefore, when it would be inefficient to 
go to trial, prosecutors have an incentive to overcharge initially to ensure that 
justice is served through the plea-bargaining process.59  Extending this line of 
reasoning even further, it makes sense for prosecutors to overcharge because it 
allows the prosecutor to gain leverage at the outset and control the parameters 
of the bargaining process.60  Failure to control the bargaining process could 
result in a prosecutor being forced into an undesirable trial, potentially 
consuming resources better expended on a multitude of other cases.  Thus, the 
                                                        
 52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra Part I (discussing the heightened ethical obligations incumbent on 
prosecutors). 
 54. See Vanover, supra note 49, at 192. 
 55. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2470–71; see also Landes, supra note 46, at 63 (using these 
motivations as a “prosecutor’s decisional rule” in the author’s theoretical model of the plea-
bargaining process). 
 56. See Landes, supra note 46, at 63. 
 57. See id. at 64; see also Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1138 (discussing the justification that 
plea-bargaining allows for efficient resource management). 
 58. See Landes, supra note 46, at 64. 
 59. See Meares, supra note 7, at 863–67 & n.52 (discussing the reasons for prosecutorial 
discretion, including limited resources and individualized justice, and explaining the function of 
overcharging to obtain pleas). 
 60. See id. at 863 (“The prosecutor’s vast charging discretion necessarily translates into 
power in the plea bargaining context. . . . Once a prosecution is initiated, the prosecutor can 
manipulate the offenses on which to charge the accused to control the defendant’s exposure to 
punishment.”). 
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scarcity of prosecutorial resources, and the corresponding inability to prosecute 
all cases, creates an inherent motivation to overcharge defendants during plea 
negotiations.   
Even though both sides in a criminal plea deal are gambling, in the sense 
that each side balances the value and cost of a deal, defendants face inherent 
costs that prosecutors do not.  Because defendants stand to lose significantly 
more than prosecutors by not settling, negotiations are fundamentally skewed 
in ways that may lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty and to guilty 
defendants serving sentences disproportionate to their crimes.61  Among the 
impediments that generate unfavorable equilibrium points (outcomes) for 
defendants vis-à-vis the prosecution, is their lack of experience playing the 
plea-negotiation game.62  In a negotiation predicated on an asymmetry of 
information, defendants must grapple with often-complex facts and procedures 
that they do not understand, and as a result, they are much more likely than 
prosecutors to make sub-optimal decisions.63  Court-appointed attorneys may 
minimize this shortcoming, but the extent of mitigation varies widely 
depending on the quality of counsel available.64  Exacerbating this point is the 
perception that prosecutors gain from having a reputation of toughness,65 
which may inspire them to utilize their superior bargaining position and 
experiences to further that reputation at the expense of just outcomes.66   
Additionally, trial often costs the defendant more, in terms of higher fees and 
increased risk, than it does the prosecutor.67  In most game-theory models, 
prosecutors must balance the State’s resources—of the public enterprise and 
well-being—but never their own out-of-pocket expenses.68  Finally, 
defendants’ risks are, of course, more personally motivated and, therefore, 
more likely to induce risk-averse behavior than the risks faced by 
                                                        
 61. See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
 62. Grossman & Katz, supra note 43, at 751–52. 
 63. Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal 
System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 987–88 (2008). 
 64. Cf. Guldorizzi, supra note 33, at 765–66 (observing the financial disincentives that may 
compromise the utility of court-appointed counsel); see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2475 (“In 
plea bargaining, it is easier for inexperienced lawyers to fall afoul of unwritten norms by pushing 
too hard, not hard enough, or not in the right way.”). 
 65. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1471, 1501 (1993). 
 66. Grossman & Katz, supra note 43, at 751. 
 67. Compare Bibas, supra note 14, at 2471 (noting that prosecutors have no financial stake 
in the outcome of any particular case), with id. at 2476 (discussing the limitations defendants have 
in affording counsel to defend them at trial), and Meares, supra note 7, at 867 (discussing the 
“trial penalty” defendants face when choosing to go to trial, where the stakes are higher in terms 
of potential punishment); see also Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1133–35 (contrasting civil 
bargaining with criminal bargaining, because criminal defendants do not have an ability 
equivalent to that of civil defendants to inflict costs, monetary and otherwise, on the opposing 
party). 
 68. Landes, supra note 46, at 63–69. 
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prosecutors.69  Given identical facts, defendants must necessarily be more risk 
averse, even if innocent, than a prosecutor.70  If defendants do not settle, they 
face the potential loss of entire years of freedom, connections with loved ones, 
and earning capacity, among other potential costs—prosecutors do not face any 
such losses.71  Game-theory models show that prosecutors only stand to lose 
time and resources spent going to trial, which they could have spent pursuing 
other defendants.72  
One could argue that if a prosecutor fails to broker an optimal settlement, 
then the value of public justice will be diminished, whereas the judicial 
economy is preserved.73  However, the value of a “just result” obtained 
through a plea bargain—although theoretically valuable to prosecutors as 
agents of society at large74—is rarely cognizable as a personal loss to the 
prosecutor if the bargain fails.  For instance, assume the theoretically “just 
result” in a given scenario is for a defendant to serve two years in prison.  Due 
to the incentive to overcharge,75 the prosecutor seeks a three-year sentence, but 
the plea bargaining fails, and the case is forced to trial.  If the defendant 
receives the two-year sentence after being convicted at trial, the prosecutor will 
only feel the loss of judicial waste (lost time and money at trial) if he or she 
could have avoided incurring such losses by not overcharging.  However, it is 
very rare for prosecutors to be reprimanded for either overcharging or for 
inefficient settlement negotiations.76 
                                                        
 69. Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1132 (juxtaposing the prosecutor’s concern about meeting 
society’s demand for vengeance, deterrence, and fairness with the defendant’s concern about loss 
of freedom, reputation, and other damage to his personal well-being). 
 70. See Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 85 (“The prosecutor can hope that a defendant 
will be risk averse and will accept a plea to charges greater than the case’s true value simply to 
avoid the remote chance of a conviction on far more serious charges.”); see also Bowers, supra 
note 40, at 1158 (“In the usual case, a prosecutor or judge may readily intimidate the defendant 
with the threat of an excessive posttrial sentence on overcharged counts—as long as the 
prosecutor or judge is careful with her words.  Unsurprisingly, defendants choose to plea bargain, 
not because they necessarily want to do so in high-stakes cases, but because it is the sole sensible 
course.”); Covey, supra note 5, at 1245 (discussing how his proposed limitations on charge or 
sentence “discounts” during the plea-bargaining process would “prevent prosecutors from 
offering discounts so large that innocent defendants are essentially coerced to plead guilty to 
avoid the risk of a dramatically harsher sentence”). 
 71. See Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1132. 
 72. Landes, supra note 46, at 63–64. 
 73. See Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1178 (2011). 
 74. See Zacharias, supra note 25, at 1138.  Justice is served for the public through plea 
bargaining because it frees up resources to maximize deterrence overall, rather than tying up 
those resources in expensive trials.  See id. 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
 76. In general, prosecutors who commit misconduct rarely face serious consequences, such 
as criminal or civil liability, or discipline from a state ethics board.  Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. 
Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of 
Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 
405–08 (2009).  Furthermore, because criminal convictions are nearly always affirmed on appeal, 
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Game theory reveals these shortcomings of plea bargaining and 
demonstrates that new policies need to be implemented to re-equilibrate the 
game of plea bargaining.77  The asymmetry of information inherent to plea 
bargaining overwhelmingly favors prosecutors because they have less to lose.  
For the defendant, the very threat of trial, including the potential personal risks 
involved with turning down a settlement, equates to a significant potential loss 
that many seek to avoid even if the result is fundamentally unfair.  
III.  THE PROBLEM OF COERCIVE BARGAINING 
A.  Plea Bargaining Is Not the Problem 
By itself, plea bargaining is not the problem.  Quite the contrary, it is 
essential to our judicial process.78  According to one commentator, it defines 
“contemporary criminal prosecution.”79  Plea and sentence bargaining are only 
problematic, as previously set forth, when an accused is coerced into a so-
called bargain for fear of punishment disproportionate to his or her actual 
criminal conduct, if any.80  Yet, some persist in painting the entire practice of 
plea bargaining as the problem.  Detractors maintain that plea bargaining is a 
product of “laziness, bureaucratization, overcriminalization, and economic 
pressure.”81  Although elements of each may, and do, foster dependence on 
plea bargaining, it is ultimately a function of a burgeoning population,82 
                                                                                                                                
the threat of having a conviction overturned due to prosecutorial misconduct may serve as a 
minimal deterrent for improper overcharging.  Id. at 408. 
 77. See Covey, supra note 5, at 1240–41 (highlighting the need for changes in plea 
bargaining and noting a variety of proposed methods for addressing the shortcomings). 
 78. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 79. Ana Maria Gutiérrez, Comment, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea 
Bargaining in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 708 (2010) (citing 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 
(1992)).  Ana Maria Gutiérrez explains that of the approximately 83,391 federal criminal cases in 
the fiscal year 2004, ninety-five percent of convictions “were disposed of without a trial through 
the entry of guilty pleas.”  Id. at 708–09 (citing SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11); accord Edward L. 
Wilkinson, Ethical Plea Bargaining Under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 
39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717, 718 (2008) (noting that ninety-five percent of all felony criminal cases 
in the United States are resolved through plea bargaining). 
 80. See Ross, supra note 29, at 880; see also Wilkinson, supra note 79, at 722 (recognizing 
that defendants’ choice of whether to plead guilty is affected greatly by the defendants’ 
assessment of the case against them, and by a desire to receive leniency in return for cooperation 
with the State). 
 81. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1979).  Professor Albert Alschuler also notes that although plea bargaining was rare throughout 
the history of common law, practices such as “nullifying harsh penalties through unilateral 
exercises of discretion and bargaining for information . . . have far more venerable histories.”  Id. 
at 4. 
 82. Historically, as the U.S. population has grown, the percentage of its citizens who are 
incarcerated has held steady.  Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society 
Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 683 (2010).  However, in the past four decades, 
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poverty,83 urbanization,84 the prevalence of drugs,85 and the nature of the 
adversarial process.86  The contemporary criminal-justice infrastructure simply 
cannot accommodate each criminal defendant with a trial.87  
Furthermore, even critics of plea bargaining must acknowledge that some 
form of bargaining is the norm, even in the most mundane types  
                                                                                                                                
the prison population has increased from 200,000 in the 1970s to 2.3 million in 2008—an 800 
percent increase.  Id.  This explosion of criminal cases has placed tremendous pressure on public 
defenders, whose caseloads are generally so large that they usually only have time to encourage 
their clients to take plea offers, rather than assess their clients’ cases and formulate defenses.  See 
id. at 691 (describing the norm as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em”).  Prosecutors, of course, also 
recognize the value of plea bargaining when dealing with the massive number of criminal cases 
they are expected to prosecute.  Tara Harrison, The Pendulum of Justice: Analyzing the Indigent 
Defendant’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1185, 1195 (citing 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHEN PLEADING NOT GUILTY AT THE PLEA 
BARGAINING STAGE § 21.1(c) (4th ed. 2004)).  For example, in 2002, over ninety percent of all 
felony convictions resulted from the procurement of guilty pleas from criminal defendants.  Id. at 
1194. 
 83. See Shiv Narayan Persaud, Conceptualizations of Legalese in the Course of Due 
Process, from Arrest to Plea Bargain: The Perspectives of Disadvantaged Offenders, 31 N.C. 
CENT. L. REV. 107, 146 (2009) (“The [plea-bargaining process] . . . affects the lives of a vast 
number of suspects, the majority of whom are poor, typically minorities, who possess little formal 
education.”); see also Jacqueline Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United 
States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 728 (2006) (“Defense counsel for poor defendants 
benefit from resolving their cases quickly.”); cf. Bowers, supra note 40, at 1132–34 (discussing 
how defendants may be motivated to accept a plea offer in order to avoid the costs of defending 
against criminal charges, which include legal fees, lost wages, and “higher process costs” 
associated with “put[ting] forward positive defenses; these substantive defenses generally require 
more preparation time than procedural claims”). 
 84. One viable explanation for how urbanization results in increased plea-bargaining is that 
criminal defendants in large urban areas may experience significant difficulties in obtaining  
pre-plea discovery beyond a police report.  Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s 
Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 88–89 (2009).  Urbanization may also 
contribute to the increased use of plea bargaining in less obvious ways.  For example, beginning 
in the 1970s, the nation’s criminal-justice infrastructure began seeking indirect ways to combat 
urban violence, including increased prosecution of drug offenses, which are often associated with 
violence.  William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1997 (2008).  In these 
cases, federal sentencing rules encouraged local prosecutors to frequently seek favorable plea 
bargains, which resulted in widespread criminal punishment in urban areas.  Id. 
 85. See Stuntz, supra note 84, at 1997.  Another way in which the prevalence of drugs 
increases plea bargaining relates to the use of criminal informants.  In cases involving drugs, 
prosecutors must often rely on the testimony of criminal informants to win convictions.  See 
Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 993 (2008).  Because these informants are criminal offenders looking to 
reduce their own punishments, prosecutors must frequently resort to the use of plea bargaining in 
order to encourage them to cooperate.  Id. 
 86. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 
1104–05 (1988). 
 87. See Ross, supra note 83, at 726 (“Without plea bargains, the legal system would have to 
reduce procedural and evidentiary safeguards on trials to accommodate the dramatic increase in 
the number of trials . . . .”). 
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of cases.88  Sentence bargaining is one such example.  Before defendants agree 
to plead to the precise charge filed, they typically strike a bargain with the 
prosecutor about the actual length of sentence they must serve.89  To reach this 
settlement, prosecutors and defendants have open discussions about the 
consequences of the bargain, thereby allowing defendants to be informed when 
entering their pleas and thereafter receiving their sentences.90  This 
arrangement is called sentence bargaining because the charge filed is not in 
dispute; rather, the defendant pleads to the filed charge, and the only point in 
question is the sentence to be imposed.91   
Plea bargaining, in contrast to sentence bargaining, typically involves 
negotiations about several charges.92  These negotiations conclude with either 
the dismissal of some charges in exchange for a guilty plea to one or more 
other charges, or a downgrade of the original charge in exchange for a guilty 
plea to this lesser charge.93  Typically, even this basic plea-bargain 
arrangement involves some degree of sentence bargaining.94  In most cases, by 
pleading guilty to a lesser charge, the defendant subjects himself to a shorter 
sentence range of which the judiciary could approve.95  Thus, plea bargaining, 
as an integral component of the criminal justice system, is here to stay.96  
Rather than complete abolition, it is the unethical abuse of the unique 
bargaining positions that needs to be eradicated.97 
                                                        
 88. See, e.g., Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 399–400 (“[A]s every criminal 
defendant knows, refusing to plea bargain carries a trial penalty whereby prosecutors seek (and 
frequently attain) longer sentences for defendants who gamble on trial and lose.”); Michael M. 
O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) (“Plea 
bargaining now dominates the day-to-day operation of the American criminal justice system; 
about ninety-five percent of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea. . . . Increasingly, 
scholars are turning their attention from abolition to reform, seeking ways to improve an 
institution that seems unlikely to disappear any time soon.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 89. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of 
International Crimes, 181 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 10 n.27. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Bibas, supra note 14, at 252–58 
(calling “the abolition of plea bargaining as the only way to eradicate all of [its] flaws[,]” an 
“impractical” solution”); Wilkinson, supra note 79, at 718 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of the plea-bargaining process as essential to the judicial process). 
 97. Wilkinson, supra note 79, at 719 (asserting that abolition is not feasible and proposing 
an alternative approach aimed at eliminating the prosecutors’ ability to coerce pleas). 
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B.  A Short History of Plea Bargaining 
Although plea bargaining now accounts for an overwhelming majority of 
case dispositions,98 the process was almost unheard of throughout most of the 
history of the common law.99  As late as the eighteenth century, judges, rather 
than lawyers, dominated trials in English courts.100  Trials were completed so 
quickly that there was no need for bargaining.101  This efficiency typically now 
occurs with non-judicial resolution.102  In fact, the Old Bailey court “tried 
between twelve and twenty felony cases per day.”103  The primary reason trials 
were disposed of so quickly was the lack of attorneys involved, which kept 
jury trials short because there were no motions, legal maneuvers, or speeches 
from lawyers.104  At the Old Bailey, only two juries of twelve men were used  
                                                        
 98. See Robert L. Segar, Plea Bargaining Techniques, 25 AM. JUR. TRIALS 69, 74 (1978). 
 99. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 1017 (“[P]lea bargaining appeared only recently on the 
penal landscape. . . . [I]n the late eighteen century, . . . guilty pleas probably were not plea 
bargains in the sense that the defendant won some understood concession in exchange for his 
plea, but rather gestures of remorse or hopelessness or unsecured bids for judicial mercy.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 100. John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 261, 261 (1979).  Professor George Fisher explains: 
Except in state trials such as treason, no public prosecutor took part in eighteenth-
century criminal cases.  Not until 1879 did Parliament institute public prosecutors to 
manage other felony cases.  In the eighteenth century, no matter how serious the case, 
the crime victim or her survivors managed the prosecution.  And not until the very end 
of the century did any substantial proportion of crime victims even hire private lawyers 
to manage the proceedings in court. 
Fisher, supra note 10, at 1018. 
 101. Langbein, supra note 100, at 261–62 (noting that “well into the eighteenth  
century[,] . . . [one court] tried between twelve and twenty felony cases per day”); accord 
Alschuler, supra note 81, at 8 (noting that Professor John Langbein discovered that “jury trials 
were extremely rapid in an era when neither party was represented by counsel, when an 
informally selected jury might hear several cases before retiring, and when the law of evidence 
was almost entirely undeveloped”).   
 102. Id. (“[C]ommon law trial procedure exhibited a degree of efficiency that we now expect 
only of our nontrial procedure.  Jury trial was a summary proceeding.” (emphasis in original)); 
see Fisher, supra note 10, at 1018 (arguing that “the very unmodern brevity of eighteenth-century 
trials, a handful of which fit into the average court day, removed modern temptations to shortcut 
trial procedures with rough-and-ready plea bargains”).  Additionally, Fisher points to evidence 
that “the length of the average trial . . . more than doubled in the late nineteenth century just as 
substantial numbers of criminal cases began to end in guilty pleas.”  Id. 
 103. Langbein, supra note 100, at 262. The first common law trial to last longer than one day 
did not occur until 1794, at which point the court had to determine whether it had the power to 
adjourn for the day.  Langbein, supra note 100, at 262 (quoting F.D. MacKinnon, The Law and 
the Lawyers, in 2 JOHNSON’S ENGLAND: AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND MANNERS OF HIS AGE 
287, 307 (A.S. Tuberville ed., 1933)); see also Alschuler, supra note 81, at 8. 
 104. Langbein, supra note 100, at 263.  Langbein points out that, “Neither prosecution nor 
defense was represented in ordinary criminal trials. . . . The victim or other complaining witness, 
sometimes aided by the lay constable and the lay justice of the peace, performed the role we now 
assign to the public prosecutor, gathering evidence and presenting it at trial.”  Id. at 263 (footnote 
omitted).  Other reasons for the brevity of trials included: the lack of voir dire; the role of the 
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to resolve “as many as a hundred felony trials in a few days.”105  
Interestingly enough, Anglo-American courts actually discouraged guilty 
pleas106 well into the nineteenth century.107   The first reported American case 
that addressed a guilty plea, as opposed to a verdict, occurred in Massachusetts 
in 1804.108  The prosecution charged a man with raping and murdering a 
thirteen-year-old girl.109  The defendant pleaded guilty to both charges.110  The 
court warned the defendant of “the consequence of his plea, and that he was 
under no legal or moral obligation to plead guilty[,]” but he refused to retract 
his plea.111  In response, the court sent him back to jail to give him a 
reasonable period of time to consider these warnings, and the court instructed 
its clerk not to record any guilty plea at that time.112  When the defendant 
reappeared before the court, he again refused to retract his plea, and the court 
sentenced him to death for the charge of rape.113  Only one other proceeding 
involving a guilty plea was reported in American courts before the Civil 
War.114  In that case, the court’s warnings persuaded the defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea and stand trial.115 
These attempts to dissuade guilty pleas proved critical when defendants 
began challenging the plea process as violating their due-process rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.116  In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 
issue in the case of Hallinger v. Davis.117  The Court upheld the guilty plea 
where “the [trial] court refrained from at once accepting [the defendant’s] plea 
                                                                                                                                
accused as witness without any privilege against self-incrimination; less structured presentations 
of evidence as witness examinations; much less complex rules of evidence; lack of controls for 
abuse of police power, such as the exclusionary rule; and the virtual absence of any opportunity 
for appeal.  Id. at 268–69. 
 105. Id. at 263.  Furthermore, these juries would hear several unrelated cases before making a 
decision in any of the cases. Id. 
 106. The modern legal term “guilty plea” has only been used for about one century, despite 
the existence of the practice for over eight hundred years; rather, they used to be called 
“confessions.”  See Alschuler, supra note 81, at 13. 
 107. See id. at 5 (“The judicial practice of discouraging guilty pleas persisted into the second 
half of the nineteenth century, but at about this time prosecutorial plea bargaining emerged.”). 
 108. Id. at 9 (citing Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 95, 95–96 (1804)). 
 109. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) at 95. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 95–96 (warning Battis, further, “that he had a right to deny the several charges and 
put the government to the proof of them”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 96. 
 114. Id.  The clerk entered the plea only after “a very full enquiry” into the defendant’s sanity 
and the possibility of tampering.  Id. 
 115. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 9–10 (citing United States v. Dixon, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 414, 
414 (1807)). 
 116. See Dixon, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) at 414–15.  The defendant was charged with burglary and 
faced death as punishment.  Id. 
 117. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 10 (citing Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892)). 
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of guilty, assigned him counsel, and twice adjourned, for a period of several 
days, in order that he might be fully advised of the truth, force and effect of his 
plea of guilty,” before finally accepting the plea.118  According to the Court, 
these procedural safeguards ensure the protection of the defendant’s  
due-process rights.119 
With the emergence of plea bargaining in the second half of the nineteenth 
century,120 neither legislatures nor courts sanctioned the practice, and “[t]hey 
were arrived at and carried out without the official stamp of judicial 
approval.”121  At that time, when a defendant entered a guilty plea, it was well 
understood by those involved that the plea was likely obtained in exchange for 
a reduction of charges.122  Reports of these bargains spawned widespread 
public disapproval.123  Some critics thought plea bargaining threatened criminal 
defendants’ rights.124  The concern was that this practice of plea bargaining 
“shifted the focus of criminal proceedings from courtrooms to corridors.”125  
Despite its detractors, the plea-bargaining practice retained its position as the 
principal process of criminal case disposition up through the early twentieth 
                                                        
 118. Hallinger, 146 U.S. at 329. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Alschuler, supra note 81, at 5 (“The conclusion . . . that plea bargaining did not 
occur with any frequency until well into the nineteenth century raises the difficulties associated 
with ‘proving a negative.’ . . . [T]he claim that plea bargaining did not occur during any specified 
historical period cannot be established conclusively.  Nevertheless, other extra-legal  
practices—such as ‘compounding,’ the practice of making payment to the victim of a crime for 
his agreement not to prosecute—have left rich histories, and it appears probable that an 
established practice of plea bargaining would have left a significant trace.” (footnote omitted)). 
 121. Segar, supra note 98, at 75. 
 122. Id. at 74. 
 123. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 5–6.  Although no case regarding the legality of plea 
bargains reached the U.S. Supreme Court during the early years of the practice, Alschuler argues 
that there were indications at that time that the Court would have struck down the practice.  Id. at 
6. 
 124. See id. at 30 (citing Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 21–22 (1927)); Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the 
Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 866 (2004) (“[S]ome vigorously 
insist that the bargaining process is so skewed against a defendant’s interests that it should be 
abandoned altogether.”).  Professor Julian Cook details such arguments: 
[Critics] maintain that defendants are at such a bargaining disadvantage that the notion 
that the subsequently negotiated plea agreement was the product of a fair exchange 
between interested participants is illusory.  Employing contractual principles, they 
argue that such plea arrangements should be voided on account of, inter alia, duress and 
unconscionability. 
Cook, supra, at 866–87. 
 125. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 31 (“‘The usual case is now decided, not by the court, but 
by the commonwealth’s attorney [who is] often young, often rather inexperienced. . . .’” (quoting 
HUGH N. FULLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VIRGINIA 155–56 (1931))). 
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century.126  Amid this growing dependence, plea bargaining continued to be 
viewed in a negative light.127  One court labeled the plea-bargaining 
arrangement between prosecutor and defendant as a “corrupt proposition.”128  
Another court described an attorney’s promise to plea bargain as “essentially 
immoral” and against public policy.129   As late as the 1920s, the president of 
the Chicago Crime Commission criticized plea bargaining as “paltering with 
crime” and called for the removal of three judges simply because each allowed 
prosecutors to reduce felony charges to misdemeanors when the defendant was 
willing to plead guilty.130  
Plea bargaining did not gain “an aura of respectability in the criminal justice 
system” until the latter part of the twentieth century.131  In the late 1950s, 
speculation remained that the Supreme Court would find the practice 
unconstitutional.132  Yet such speculation never came to fruition,133 and in 
                                                        
 126. Id. at 6.  After several crime commissions in the 1920s acknowledged the growing 
prevalence of plea bargaining in previous decades, the practice was again subject to general 
disapproval from academics, the press, and the commissions.  Id. 
 127. See id. at 6, 29; see also Mary E. Vogel, The Special Origins of Plea Bargaining: 
Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830–1860, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 
162–63 (1999) (“Understanding these beginnings [of plea bargaining] lends insight into the 
problems the practice presents today. . . . The significance of plea bargaining lies in the fact that, 
by the late 19th century, most cases in the criminal courts were being resolved through this 
process.  Although the popular image is one of jury trials with a presumption of innocence, a very 
different process has anchored the American courts.”).  To keep the Supreme Court from finding 
plea bargaining unconstitutional, 
[T]he Department of Justice took dubious steps to prevent the Court from deciding the 
issue.  The Supreme Court then ignored this central facet of the criminal justice system 
during the period of its “due process revolution.”  At the same time, many of its 
decisions exacerbated the pressures for plea-bargaining by increasing the complexity, 
length, and cost of criminal trials. 
Alschuler, supra note 81, at 6.  Alschuler explains that “[a]lthough plea bargaining had become a 
central feature of the administration of justice by the 1920’s, it had few apologists and many 
critics.”  Id. at 29. 
 128. Golden v. State, 49 Ind. 424, 425–27 (1875). 
 129. Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 361 (1877). 
 130. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 29. 
 131. See Segar, supra note 98, at 74 (citing James Meriwether Smith & William Parry Dale, 
The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 
771–72 (1973)). 
 132. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 6.  In Shelton v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the conviction of Paul Shelton, a pro se defendant who challenged 
his conviction on the grounds that his guilty plea was involuntary “because it had been induced 
by prosecutorial promises.”  242 F.2d 101, 101 (5th Cir.), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 246 F.2d 571 
(5th Cir. 1957), rev’d on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam).  Initially reversing 
the conviction, the court said that “[j]ustice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and 
barter.”  Id. at 113.  Upon on a motion for rehearing en banc, the court changed direction and 
affirmed the trial court’s conviction, asserting that the trial record contained sufficient facts to 
permit the trial court’s finding of voluntariness.  Shelton, 246 F.2d at 573.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed the conviction based on the Solicitor General’s confession of error that the guilty 
plea “may have been improperly obtained.”  Shelton, 356 U.S. at 26.  The confession of error 
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1970, the Supreme Court decided two cases that made clear that it is not per se 
unconstitutional to offer inducements to a defendant to obtain a guilty plea.134 
The Court’s endorsement of plea bargaining, in part, reflects a recognition of 
the increased volume of cases,135 coupled with the Court’s “due process 
revolution” in the 1960s and 1970s.136  The complexity of cases and resulting 
consumption of court and prosecutorial resources necessitated this more 
expeditious mode of case disposition.137  Prosecutors found themselves 
spending more time and resources defending both convictions on appeal and 
pretrial motions.138  Constitutional rights became bargaining chips that defense 
attorneys could use as leverage to negotiate favorable dispositions.139  The 
increased protection of the accused’s constitutional rights stemming from the 
“due process revolution” provided defendants with added leverage, which led 
to more intense plea bargaining.140  
C.  A Paucity of Reliable Data 
Although one can approximate the number of cases resolved through some 
manner of plea bargaining, there is no reliable data approximating the 
percentage of dispositions that were products of coercive tactics.141  Plea 
bargaining is often undertaken in the shadows—in phone calls and e-mails 
                                                                                                                                
disclosed that “the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry when it accepted the 
defendant’s plea of guilty . . . .”  Alschuler, supra note 81, at 36. 
 133. Id. at 6.  In fact, the Supreme Court had opportunities to decide the plea-bargaining 
issue in the 1960s, but it declined to hear a case.  Id. at 37. 
 134. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790, 794–95 (1970); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“[Plea 
bargaining] is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for 
many reasons.”); Alschuler, supra note 81, at 6. 
 135. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (2005) (book review) (noting that analysts emphasized dramatically 
increased caseloads, both civil and criminal, as the cause of increased plea bargaining and the 
courts’ eventual embrace of such process); see also Alschuler, supra note 81, at 34–35 (“The 
volume of criminal cases commonly doubled from one decade to the next, while judicial 
resources increased only slightly.” (footnote omitted)). 
 136. The Court’s decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, Miranda v. Arizona, and Katz v. United 
States were emblematic of the criminal justice revolution.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351, 359 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects people, not pleas, and, 
therefore electronic surveillance of what the defendant sought to keep private was considered an 
unreasonable search and seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498–99 (1966) (holding that 
in custodial interrogations, defendants must be affirmatively appraised of their rights to safeguard 
their privileges against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) 
(holding that there is a fundamental right to counsel in a criminal prosecution, which is protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 137. Alschuler, supra note 81, at 38. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 142–46. 
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between lawyers or in the corridors outside the courtroom.142  Little or no 
evidence documents the give and take of this bargaining on the record.  At 
best, records will serve as a testament to the original charges, disclose that a 
defendant pled to one count, and document that the prosecutor dismissed 
remaining counts;143 however, the record would be devoid of any particulars as 
to what took place between these events.144  Such a bargain could have been a 
coerced plea, but there would be no trail to reveal its true nature.145  Coercive 
plea bargaining must necessarily take place out of view, as prosecutors cannot 
have such misconduct brought to light by disclosure.146  
D.  Overcharging: The Precursor to Coercive Pleas 
Some commentators suggest that prosecutors do not overcharge to obtain 
harsher sentences than the accused’s conduct merits, but rather to gain 
bargaining leverage.147  Such naiveté provokes two responses: (1) regardless of 
                                                        
 142. See Alschuler, supra note 81, at 31; supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative 
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 233 (2006) (“The record commonly includes only the result of the 
negotiations—typically, the sentence that the defendant may expect in return for a confession.”); 
see also Jennifer Blassur et al., New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: 
Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1994 (2010) 
(recognizing that plea negotiations, often undocumented, “can fall through the cracks”). 
 144. Turner, supra note 143, at 233 (“The open-court announcement [of the plea bargain 
record] would not mention potentially unlawful promises or threats that might have influenced the 
defense to accept the bargain.”). 
 145. See id.; Cf. Montré D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the “Untried Conviction” 
Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 545 (2010) (noting the lack of a transcript in the plea-
bargaining process, which essentially hides the prosecutor’s decision either “to prosecute or 
coerce a plea” from anyone not involved in the plea negotiation). 
 146. See supra Part I (detailing prosecutors’ ethical obligations). 
 147. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 75, at 1254 (noting that prosecutors generally overcharge 
simply because they desire bargaining leverage, not in an effort to impose harsher sentences); 
Meares, supra note 7, at 853 (“Prosecutors sometimes ‘overcharge’ defendants to control the 
dynamics of plea bargaining.”); Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1039 
(2004) (book review) (“Prosecutors can overcharge to gain leverage for harsh sentences, and 
judges have little power to check prosecutorial harshness.”); see also 2 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL  
§ 45:15 (West 2010) (“[T]he common practice of overcharging gives the prosecutor a stack of 
false chips with which to bargain, hoping to induce a plea to the only makeable charge by 
benevolently getting rid of charges that should never have been brought in the first place.”); 
Gerber, supra note 24, at 225–26 (“In most jurisdictions prosecutors overcharge to get negotiating 
leverage for the anticipated guilty plea.”); Wilkinson, supra note 79, at 721–23 (noting that there 
is “fear that the prosecutor will ‘overcharge’ a defendant with additional weak or baseless charges 
or unnecessary sentencing enhancements in an effort to gain leverage in subsequent plea 
negotiations”); Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to A Plea 
Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 463 (1995) (“The 
prosecutor might overcharge the defendant merely to gain leverage to force the defendant to plead 
guilty.”); Ty Alper, Note, The Danger of Winning: Contract Law Ramifications of Successful 
Bailey Challenges for Plea-Convicted Defendants, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 874 (1997) (“The 
prosecutor uses these ‘overcharged’ offenses as leverage to induce the defendant to plead 
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motivating factors, overcharging violates prosecutorial ethics in and of 
itself;148 (2) overcharging sets the stage for coercive pleas by virtue of the very 
leverage unduly obtained.149  
If our criminal justice system were trial-centered, prosecutors would only 
have reason to file charges on which they would likely secure a conviction.150  
However, because most criminal convictions are secured through plea 
negotiations, prosecutors have an incentive to file more serious charges than 
those supported by the evidence with the “hope that a defendant will be risk 
averse.”151  Furthermore, prosecutors lack any political incentive to refrain 
from overcharging because most communities want the state to be tough on 
crime.152  
Because prosecutors have an incentive to encourage pretrial dispositions, 
many include all possible charges in an indictment, including those with very 
little support.153  To meet minimal ethical standards, prosecutors need only 
show that they have probable cause to “believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute.”154  Although there are persuasive arguments in 
                                                                                                                                
guilty.”); Rand N. White & Tom E. Wilson, Note, The Preliminary Hearing in California: 
Adaptive Procedures in a Plea Bargain System of Criminal Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1207, 1211 
(1976) (“Substantial evidence suggests that many prosecutors ‘overcharge,’ i.e., file a more 
serious charge than the complaint warrants, to increase their plea bargaining leverage.”). 
 148. See infra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Gerber, supra note 24, at 226 (“[F]rom the very start prosecutors wish to create 
negotiating leverage to coerce a plea.”). 
 150. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 85; see also Yin, supra note 147, at 463 (“The 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime limits the 
prosecutor’s ability to overcharge.”). 
 151. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 85; see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2495 
(“Prosecutorial bluffing is likely to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who are 
on average more risk averse than guilty defendants.”); cf. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea 
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2342 (2006) (arguing that the plea-bargaining system 
should be eliminated entirely because “[t]he practice motivates prosecutors to overcharge 
defendants in order to improve their negotiating positions”). 
 152. Cf. Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practical Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 241 (2006) 
(“[I]n an environment in which crime has become a very important political issue, it is a safer 
strategy for legislators to criminalize more conduct than simply that which they and the public 
would like to see prosecuted.”). 
 153. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 107.  Prosecutors, however, claim that this practice is 
not overcharging because they expect to be able to support these charges with further 
investigation and discovery, which will reveal additional evidence.  Id.  Prosecutors prefer to limit 
the term overcharging “to the filing of charges when there is not likely to be sufficient proof to 
convict a defendant of the charges by the time of trial.”  Id. 
 154. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Meares, supra note 7, at 865.  In 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor’s overcharging of the 
defendant, reasoning that threatening harsher punishment to induce a guilty plea is “inevitable 
and permissible” so long as the defendant plainly could have been prosecuted on the harsher 
charges, despite the discouraging effect such a practice clearly might have on the defendant’s 
desire to exercise his trial rights.  See 434 U.S. at 364–65 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 
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favor of flexible charging discretion,155 broad prosecutorial discretion 
diminishes a defendant’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter into a 
guilty plea.156  Exacerbating the problem, “often it takes nothing more than a 
fertile imagination to spin several crimes out of a single transaction.”157 
Scholars suggest that there are two basic types of overcharging.158  
Prosecutors can engage in either horizontal overcharging by filing charges for 
distinct crimes resulting from similar offensive conduct,159 or vertical 
overcharging by charging harsh variations of the same crime when the 
evidence only supports lesser variations.160  Usually, prosecutors can choose 
from a number of potential charges.161  For instance, in the Marcus-Alfred 
hypothetical scenario that began this Article, the street terrorism charge is a 
classic illustration of horizontal overcharging; the hypothetical prosecutor 
brought this additional charge when one—robbery—would have sufficed.  An 
example of vertical overcharging, on the other hand, would be filing a  
first-degree murder charge when only a second-degree murder is 
appropriate.162 
                                                                                                                                
U.S. 17, 31 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But cf. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 151, at 
2342–43 (“The main problem facing weak case defendants today is that prosecutors can induce 
them to plead guilty while also totally conforming to the existing legal rules.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 1524, 1530–31 (1984) (“Th[e] [prosecutor’s] 
broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly  
ill-suited to judicial review. . . . Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal 
proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and 
decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing 
the Government’s enforcement policy.”). 
 156. Meares, supra note 7, at 866. 
 157. Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing Munson v. McClaughry, 198 F. 72, 74 (8th Cir. 1912)). 
 158. Covey, supra note 75, at 1254–55 (“Prosecutors can overcharge cases in at least two 
ways. . . . Both types of overcharging make it easier for prosecutors to induce defendants to plead 
guilty by increasing defendants’ sentencing exposure at trial.”). 
 159. Gutiérrez, supra note 79, at 715–16 (“Notwithstanding the fact that the illicit conduct 
sought to be punished is adequately penalized by a single count, prosecutors will engage in 
horizontal overcharging by charging ‘nonoverlapping counts of a similar offense, type, or 
multiple counts of the same offense type.’” (quoting Covey, supra note 75, at 1254)).  For an 
example of horizontal overcharging, see Leopard v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1326,  
1332–33 (E.D. Okla. 2001) (permitting the charging of a defendant with two counts arising out of 
the same conduct because each count required proof of unique elements). 
 160. See Covey, supra note 75, at 1254; Gutiérrez, supra note 79, at 716.  The more severe 
charge will likely withstand judicial scrutiny if the prosecutor is able to articulate an argument in 
support of the potential for conviction at trial.  Gutiérrez, supra note 79, at 716–17. 
 161. See Ross, supra note 83, at 728 (“[O]verbreadth of criminal statutes . . . makes it 
possible to charge one course of conduct under a multiplicity of overlapping legal descriptions.”).  
Prosecutors can abuse their discretion to select from the many available charges to “induce a 
guilty plea to a prison term well above the realistic ‘market price’ for the crime.”  See id. 
 162. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 147, at 462–63 (“[T]he prosecutor often can choose from a 
variety of charges, each carrying a different base-offense level.  For example, in an assault case, a 
86 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:63 
V.  PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO OVERCHARGING  
Through the years, scholars have proposed various solutions to the serious 
problem of prosecutorial overcharging.163  Although thoughtfully developed, 
these proposals have not been adopted, and even if adopted they would have 
proven ineffective in reducing overcharging.  Scholars who offer such 
solutions share the belief that modifying the charges, or perhaps the charging 
system, will reduce prosecutorial overcharging by removing the very tool used 
by the prosecutors to accomplish the task. 
In 1976, for instance, Professor Albert Alschuler suggested using “sentence 
bargaining” instead of “charge bargaining,” a tactic that would require 
prosecutors to file only the most appropriate charge and reserve any bargaining 
for sentencing recommendations, thus reducing any incentive a prosecutor 
might have to overcharge.164  He reasoned that if the ultimate sentence is not 
necessarily determined by the charges, but by the evidence, then the resulting 
sentence will be free of any coercion.165  Although a seemingly positive 
suggestion, it merely places another name on the same problem.  Prosecutors 
would continue to have the power to offer disparate bargains and manipulate 
defendants.  They would be simply exercising that power with sentence 
recommendations instead of charges.   
Professor Stephanos Bibas suggests increased and open discovery during 
plea negotiations, reasoning that with full discovery, defense counsel will be in 
an optimum position to evaluate the state’s case and recognize if his or her 
case has been overcharged.166  This approach suggests that counsel and 
defendant, armed with information, will fall prey to coercive tactics, but will 
recognize the worth of his or her case and undertake case disposition on an 
equal plane with the prosecutor, as opposed to being cowed into a 
disadvantageous bargain.167  Nonetheless, even with increased disclosure to 
facilitate the defendant’s understanding of the potentially weak evidentiary 
support for certain charges against him or her, the risk of testing that evidence 
at trial remains a threat to the defendant.168  Consequently, risk-averse 
defendants, confronted with the significant downside of an unfavorable trial 
                                                                                                                                
prosecutor conceivably could charge a defendant with Assault with Intent to Commit  
Murder . . . Aggravated Assault . . . or Minor Assault . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 163. Solutions to this problem were proposed as early as 1976—a time when this problem 
was not nearly as prevalent as it is in today’s criminal landscape.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1136–38 (1976) 
(proposing abolition of charge bargaining). 
 164. Alschuler, supra note 163, at 143–44. 
 165. See id. at 1144. 
 166. See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2531 (“The obvious remedy is to liberalize discovery.  
Discovery rules designed for plea bargaining would provide more information earlier.”). 
 167. See id. (“[W]ide disparities or variations in each party’s information threaten equity and 
fairness.”). 
 168. See Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 2008. 
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verdict, may be motivated to plead to the lesser charge or sentence, fully aware 
of the weak nature of the state’s case. 
Another scholar, Professor Darryl Brown, views the criminal codes 
themselves as the problem.169  After finding that the expansive, and often 
unnecessary, litany of crimes allows prosecutors to “stack charges,” he 
acknowledges that reducing the codes by removing “outdated, marginal, or 
unnecessarily duplicative code provisions” would have little effect on the 
prosecutors pre-bargaining power.170  As Brown correctly points out, plea 
bargaining was in practice before the growth of criminal codes,171 and the 
majority of prosecutions occur under a limited number of statutes, even though 
other options are available.172  For example, he notes that approximately 
eighty-five percent of drug crimes constitute drug sale, delivery, possession 
with intent to distribute, or simple possession, but that a multitude of other 
charges exist, each carrying distinct grading and sentencing variations 
available to prosecutors.173  With the variations of grading available, 
prosecutors can charge the same crime at various levels and be squarely within 
the criminal codes of many jurisdictions.174  These provisions provide varied 
offense definitions and permit the prosecutor to choose from among them.175  
Furthermore, Brown recognizes that it is not the number of charges, but rather 
the sentencing implications of those charges that make plea bargaining such a 
powerful prosecutorial tool.176  Removing the duplicative code provisions 
would not remove the incentive to plea bargain, nor the prosecutors’ power to 
offer charges with higher sentences.177   
Professor Daniel Medwed has recommended altering the charging threshold, 
believing that elevating the charging standard above probable cause will force 
prosecutors to file more meaningful charges.178  As the Supreme Court stated, 
“It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a 
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being 
                                                        
 169. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 223–24 
(2007). 
 170. Id. at 273, 276. 
 171. Id. at 272–73. 
 172. Id. at 271–72. 
 173. Id. at 272–73.  Similarly, the majority of property crimes fall under burglary, larceny, 
auto theft, arson, forgery, and embezzlement.  Id. at 272. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 273. 
 177. See id. at 274 (“Leaner, more coherent substantive codes would likely have only modest 
effects on prosecutorial bargaining power and practice . . . .”). 
 178. See Daniel S. Medwed, What Really Works?: Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial 
Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2197 (2010). 
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condemned.”179  An enhanced standard may be one solution; however, the 
concern remains whether prosecutors would comply.  
Another general approach focuses on prosecutorial oversight, suggesting that 
regulating prosecutors themselves is the solution to overcharging.180  Scholars 
who advocate this approach suggest various measures to provide oversight of 
prosecutors both during and after the charging process.  For example, Professor 
Richard Birke recommended creating a notation on the case file indicating that 
the original charges were dropped pursuant to a plea bargain.181  This would 
allow the judge to make an inquiry into the original offense and determine if 
the plea bargain was coercive.182  
Similarly, Bibas suggests that prosecutorial agencies should promulgate 
policies requiring supervisory review and approval for charging and plea 
bargains.183  Noting the problem of prosecutorial self-interest, which motivates 
many attorneys “to safeguard their reputations, win-loss records, and egos by 
not risking losses at trial,” Bibas advocates that supervisory review of written 
plea agreements would force prosecutors to justify their offers without relying 
on self-interested reasons.184  Bibas further speculates as to the role judges 
could play in reviewing plea bargaining, through increased judicial oversight to 
assess the strength of prosecution’s case and determine a proper sentence.185  
Although acknowledging the fear that judicial involvement in plea bargains 
could result in judicial bias if the case proceeds to trial, Bibas counters that 
courts could automatically reassign cases to different judges if a defendant 
rejects a judge’s advice to plead.186  Alternatively, “[i]f judicial involvement is 
too radical or not feasible, nonjudicial mediators could give advice and try to 
debias the parties.”187   
Bibas also focuses on internal regulation, suggesting a reward and promotion 
system that would permit feedback from a range of sources.188  This feedback 
would be compiled and used by supervising prosecutors to evaluate the 
performance of their peers.189  Supervising prosecutors would use these 
                                                        
 179. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (referring to the reasonable doubt standard 
used in criminal trials). 
 180. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 14, at 2541; Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and 
Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 223–24. 
 181. Birke, supra note 180, at 223. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Bibas, supra note 14, at 2541. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 2542 (“More thorough judicial oversight could catch the most blatant types of 
poor lawyering.  By digging into the evidence, judges might gain a sense of how strong the 
government’s case is and thus how large a discount to award at sentencing.”). 
 186. Id. at 2543. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. 441, 
444, 448 (2009). 
 189. Id. at 444–45. 
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performance reviews to assess “zeal, investigation, research, rhetorical skill, 
professionalism, ethics, diligence, courtesy, respect, and satisfaction” when 
making promotional decisions.190  When collecting this data, supervising 
prosecutors would survey defense lawyers and judges who regularly interact 
with the junior prosecutors, as well as the victims and defendants involved in 
their cases.191  Theoretically, the defense lawyers and judges would provide 
information regarding overcharging, and prosecutors who routinely overcharge 
would be censured by not receiving promotions.192  Bibas’s approaches suffer 
from the general concerns that afflict any internal-oversight system, 
specifically that policing one’s peers is generally ineffective.193  
Each of these proposed solutions is thoughtful and provides blocks to build 
upon.  It is with appreciation of these proposals that the remedy ventured 
hereafter is constructed. 
VI.  A NEW APPROACH: SYSTEMATIC AUDITS FROM AN OVERSIGHT TEAM  
A.  Internal Oversight 
Any approach that might curb, if not end, the practice of coercive 
prosecutorial overcharging to gain the negotiating leverage must start with 
greater oversight of charging decisions.194  Oversight can come from within or 
from outside an organization.195  Internal oversight, as the term so often 
implies, can be a non sequitur. Nonetheless, internal oversight has the 
advantages of familiarity and even expertise with the very problems 
investigated, facilitating swift reaction to identified problems.196  The concern, 
                                                        
 190. Id. at 444. 
 191. Id. at 445–47. 
 192. See id. at 446 (“When judges or bar authorities find misconduct but refuse to suspend or 
disbar, supervisors can still use this information in deciding whom to reward and promote.”). 
 193. See supra Part V.A. 
 194. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 14, at 2541; Bibas, supra note 147, at 1042; Bibas, supra 
note 188, at 447–48; Birke, supra note 182, at 223.  Birke recognizes: 
The prosecutor has every incentive to overcharge in anticipation of the reduction.  
Therefore, a notation on the case file will alert the judge to the crime as originally 
charged . . . . If then, a judge were to hear a plea . . . it would follow that there would 
(or at least should) be an inquiry into the real offense for which the defendant was to be 
sentenced. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  But see Gutiérrez, supra note 79, at 717 (recognizing the necessary limits 
of judicial oversight arising out of institutional competency and separation-of-powers concerns). 
 195. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–29 
(2008). 
 196. For example, internal oversight of prosecutorial decision making can be valuable in 
helping to expose and eliminate prosecutorial bias.  See, e.g., id. at 163–65.  In their 
comprehensive review of several internal oversight programs, Professors Marc L. Miller and 
Ronald F. Wright analyze the Milwaukee District Attorney’s office’s data-management program, 
which exposed significant discrepancies in how individual prosecutors were charging and 
prosecuting defendants involved in marijuana-possession cases.  Id.  The District Attorney 
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of course, is that internal oversight may not provide the level of objectivity, 
scrutiny, and rigor essential to identify problems or take the necessary 
corrective action.197  Lack of objectivity in reviewing the conduct of others 
within the same organization is an obvious and inherent concern,198 and even 
when partisan or protective concerns may be overcome, that very scrutiny 
could be a destructive force within the organization.199 
The efficacy of internal oversight is further diminished because the 
examiners are generally subject to the same culture and norms as those 
overseen.200  Overcharging may well be the accepted norm in a given 
prosecutor’s office, and the efforts to break such norms are particularly 
troublesome.  As previously suggested, an elected prosecutor has little 
incentive to change how cases are filed.201  Requiring closer scrutiny and more 
rigid screening criteria may be met with public disdain, as the public may 
interpret these safeguards as interfering with criminal justice.  Furthermore, 
internal oversight will have detractors simply because it is not subject to 
                                                                                                                                
analyzed this data and discovered evidence of systematic racial bias in the charging of these 
cases, which, in his view, caused this unacceptable outcome.  Id. at 169.  Accordingly, he 
implemented an office-wide training program, tailored specifically to prosecutors’ various 
experience levels and the office’s political climate, to rectify this problem.  Id. 
 197. See id. at 168–69.  Miller and Wright describe a situation involving the U.S. Attorney 
for the District of Maine, Jay McCloskey that demonstrates the dangers of such a subjective 
viewpoint.  At a conference, McCloskey reported that his office “rarely deviate[d]” from the 
federal sentencing guidelines.  Id. (quoting Jay P. McCloskey, Panel Remarks, Sentencing 
Guidelines: Where We Are and How We Got Here, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 391, 391 (2000)).  
Unfortunately for McCloskey, national data on departures from the guidelines by federal 
prosecutors did not support his statement; in fact, the District of Maine deviated from the 
guidelines frequently enough to “put the district in the middle of the national pack.”   Id.  
Confronted with this data, McCloskey then explained that the U.S. Attorney’s Office found the 
prosecutorial and judicial departures that occurred in the state’s numerous gun control and 
immigration cases to be “reasonable,” which rendered these cases, at least in his subjective 
viewpoint, non-departures.  Id. 
 198. See id. at 171. 
 199. Little is known about the internal sanctioning and disciplinary practices that are 
employed in prosecutors’ offices.  Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 410.  Therefore, it is 
unclear if the organizational culture could support a sufficiently rigorous disciplinary system, in 
which prosecutorial actions are objectively analyzed to determine whether or not actual 
misconduct has taken place, and where sufficient sanctions are imposed when such misconduct is 
discovered.  See id. at 411–12; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 
65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1102 (1952) (“A society that holds, as we do, to belief in law cannot 
regard with unconcern the fact that prosecuting agencies can exercise so large an influence on 
dispositions that involve the penal sanction, without reference to any norms but those that they 
may create for themselves.”); cf. Miller & Wright, supra note 195, at 128 (“Scholars’ responses to 
a criminal justice world where what counts as law means so little have featured a call for greater 
external legal regulation.” (emphasis in original)). 
 200. Miller & Wright, supra note 195, at 130–31 (noting how prosecutors’ pattered reasons 
for their decisions show how they adopt “social norms” and “liv[e] up to group expectations 
about what it means to be a prosecutor in that particular office” (emphasis in original)). 
 201. See Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 76, at 398. 
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further scrutiny, which gives critics reason to question the effectiveness of any 
such oversight.202 
B. External Oversight 
The drawbacks to internal oversight suggest that, to be effective, any 
oversight must come from outside of the charging authority, and this outside 
entity must be able to enforce its findings.  Fortunately, a number of state 
constitutions provide a structural basis for statewide oversight of the counties 
or parishes that constitute the filing authorities in each state.203 For example, 
California’s Constitution specifically provides that the State Attorney General 
has a duty to “see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately 
enforced.”204  Furthermore, this provision grants the Attorney General the 
power of supervision  
over every district attorney . . . in all matters pertaining to the duties 
of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to 
make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, 
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the 
Attorney General may seem advisable. . . . When required by the 
public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General 
shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that 
office.205  
The office of the California Attorney General was established in 1850 and 
was essential in a time of unstructured law enforcement.206  It has evolved to 
serve the state’s changing needs to fulfill its purpose as the “chief law 
officer.”207 
                                                        
 202. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 203. Each state generally designates the Attorney General as its primary legal officer, either 
in its constitution or by statute.   William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, 
State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 
(2006); see also, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The attorney general shall be the chief state legal 
officer.”); ILL. CONST. art. V, § 15 (“The Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the  
State . . . .”); LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (“[T]he attorney general . . . shall be the chief legal officer 
of the state.”); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24 (“The Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting 
officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in the courts 
of record.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-192(a) (2009 & Supp. 2010) (“The attorney general 
shall . . . serve as chief legal officer of the state.”).  In addition, many state courts have recognized 
that a state’s attorney general serves as the state’s “chief legal officer.”  See, e.g., Perdue v. 
Baker, 586 S.E.2d 606, 614 (Ga. 2003); Amemiya v. Sapienza, 629 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Haw. 
1981); State ex rel. Allain v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 418 So. 2d 779, 784 (Miss. 1982); State 
ex rel. McGraw v. Burton, 569 S.E.2d 99, 107 (W.Va. 2002). 
 204. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13. 
 205. Id. 
 206. History of the Office of the Attorney General, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST., 
http://oag.ca.gov/history (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
 207. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13. 
92 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:63 
Much like the office, the powers of the Attorney General have also evolved 
over the years.  The Attorney General has consistently maintained the power to 
supervise, and where necessary, assist district attorneys,208 even with their 
essential power of prosecutorial oversight.209  Indeed, the California statute 
provides that the Attorney General maintains direct supervision over the 
district attorneys and “may, where he deems it necessary, take full charge of 
any investigation or prosecution.”210  The Supreme Court of California 
interpreted this clause, based in the constitutional provisions of section 13, to 
mean that the Attorney General may assume principal control and direction 
over business conducted by district attorneys.211  Although California courts 
have indicated that the Attorney General does not have absolute control over 
law-enforcement officials,212 the Attorney General has consistently maintained 
the power of prosecutorial supervision and oversight.213  
C.  A New Approach 
Drawing upon the various, thoughtful approaches set forth in Part IV and 
grounded by the structural support provided by many state constitutions, this 
Article proposes a workable, affordable approach to the problem of 
prosecutorial overcharging, from which coercive plea bargaining arises.  
California’s Constitution serves as the model of this proposed approach, as the 
language of this constitution is typical,214 which makes this proposal portable 
to other states.  California’s Attorney General, as the state’s top  
law-enforcement official, is vested with the constitutional authority to 
supervise the conduct of California’s various county prosecutors,215 which 
necessarily includes oversight of how the various counties conduct the 
charging process. However, this oversight authority exists today primarily in 
word only; in reality, each county’s elected district attorney operates 
autonomously.216  For the office of the State Attorney General to exercise its 
oversight authority would not be a drastic invasion of county district attorneys’ 
perogatives because the office already supports county prosecutors in 
numerous ways.  When county prosecutors are recused from prosecuting a case 
due to a local conflict, the State Attorney General provides its own prosecutors 
                                                        
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 211. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 61 Cal. 250, 254 (Cal. 1882). 
 212. See, e.g., People v. Brophy, 120 P.2d 946, 953–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). 
 213. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13. 
 214. See supra note 203. 
 215. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13. 
 216. See Miller & Wright, supra note 195, at 177–78. 
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to assume those cases.217  Other statewide functions include direction of the 
State’s Department of Justice, supervision of county sheriffs and other  
law-enforcement officers, convening grand juries, employment of special 
agents and investigators, criminal-record dissemination, and  
controlled-substances regulation.218  
However, and somewhat surprisingly, with such an important concern as 
intrastate consistency in charging crimes, there is a paucity of statewide 
oversight.219  By way of illustration, a case that would be filed as a capital case 
in San Diego County may well be filed differently in Los Angeles County, 
even when the cases share identical facts.  What was filed as a three-count 
felony in Riverside County might only draw one count in Sacramento County.  
Some will argue that such local decision making is appropriate, as it best 
reflects the constituency of each county.220  Furthermore, each county elects its 
own district attorney, and should that district attorney not represent his or her 
constituency properly, the people can remove him or her from office.  Ensuring 
proper representation, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.  The 
discussion here focuses on three concerns.   
First, as a theoretical maxim, should a statewide agency have some authority 
to provide input or oversight of county prosecutors to ensure integrity in 
charging crimes?  Second, is it even possible to identify overcharging, let alone 
to identify overcharging as a mechanism to gain negotiating leverage?  And 
finally, assuming it is proper for statewide oversight and also possible to 
identify overcharged cases, how should that oversight be administered?  
Any proposal that introduces oversight into each county’s charging process 
faces significant hurdles.  The greatest will most likely be pushback from 
county prosecutors, who have historically enjoyed a culture of autonomy.221  
Another hurdle is the cost associated with a state-run “audit team” organized 
                                                        
 217. See, e.g., Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The San Diego 
District Attorney’s office recused itself from Genzler’s second trial, and Genzler was prosecuted 
by the State Attorney General’s Office.”). 
 218. 4 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAL L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW ch. 10, § 14 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 219. See Miller & Wright, supra note 195, at 128–29 (noting the complete absence of 
legislative will to enact oversight reforms).  Miller and Wright state that: 
For those who see discretion as the opposite of law, its dominance in the prosecutor’s 
office has ripple effects throughout the criminal justice system . . . . 
   . . . [S]cholars have called for judges to review prosecutorial charging and plea-
bargaining decisions, in the hope that judges can limit and legitimize the choices that 
prosecutors make. The judicial-oversight project, however, has failed, even for the 
subset of prosecutor decisions that are based on improper bias. 
Id. at 128 (footnotes omitted). 
 220. Cf. Blassur et al., supra note 143, at 1999 (describing the effects of election on local 
prosecutors). 
 221. See Miller & Wright, supra note 195, at 129 (discussing the “lack of external 
regulation” of district attorney offices). 
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by the State Attorney General.222  A third criticism relates to the instances of 
overcharging that lead to coercive dispositions, which would most likely only 
be discussed post-plea negotiations, raising serious questions as to how 
coerced pleas would be remedied.223  This Article’s proposal addresses each of 
these concerns. 
Regardless of the propriety of statewide oversight, if such heinous practices 
do occur, there certainly should be some mechanism beyond the charging 
entity’s internal scrutiny to raise the issue.  As set forth earlier, self-policing is 
generally inadequate and may prove divisive within the policed offices.224  
Furthermore, given that overcharging to obtain leverage is an abominable 
practice, those prosecutors engaged in such practices should be exposed and 
held accountable.  In any calculus, the cost of reining in a practice that sets the 
stage for coercive pleas and sentences pales against the human tragedy of pleas 
and their consequences, which are often disproportionate to the accused’s 
conduct. 
Regarding the possibility of identifying overcharging, such identification 
must come from an entity apart from the charging prosecutor.  To undertake a 
post-plea analysis, the reviewing authority must have access to the charging 
prosecutor’s entire file, including all police reports, witness statements, 
forensic results, any documentation that the defense supplied, and transcripts 
of all court appearances leading up to the negotiated disposition.225  Armed 
with such information, a reviewer versed in the criminal justice system likely 
would be able to determine if a case was overcharged.  If the reviewer made 
such a determination, then the investigation would expand to interviews of the 
parties involved in the negotiated disposition to determine if the prosecutor 
used overcharging as leverage to obtain a plea or sentence unduly favorable to 
the state. 
As for the implementation of such a scheme, there do not appear to be any 
unrealistic barriers proscribing experienced and knowledgeable criminal-law 
practitioners from identifying when a case was overcharged and if that 
overcharging resulted in a coercive plea or sentence.  Implementation would 
                                                        
 222. Cf. Blassur et al., supra note 143, at 2029 (commenting on the resource constraint that 
prosecutors’ offices face, which make funding audits or oversight difficult). 
 223. Cf. id. at 2008. 
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Andrew M. Siegel, When Prosecutors Control Criminal Dockets: Dispatches on History and 
Policy from a Land Time Forgot, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 351–52 (2005).  This practice 
frequently has the effect of encouraging defendants to be more receptive to plea offers.  See id. at 
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docketing system have been met with fierce resistance by prosecutors, who undoubtedly wish to 
continue to enjoy the advantages of the current regime.  See id. at 346. 
 225. See Blassur et al., supra note 143, at 2008–09. 
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involve charging deputies in the Attorney General’s office with oversight 
authority in accordance with the office’s constitutional powers.226  
Realistically, this audit team would be in a position to review only a small 
number of files from each prosecutorial office.227  Any review of such a small 
sampling will not provide definitive findings; however, much like the audits 
conducted by the Internal Revenue Service, the mere fact that any given file 
could be pulled and reviewed would serve as deterrence.228  The Attorney 
General’s audit team would have access to any files they select within each 
county.  Those prosecutorial offices found to have abused their authority by 
overcharging and coercing pleas would be identified and exposed, motivating 
them to comply with their prosecutorial responsibilities in the future.  Those 
individual prosecutors found to have abused their authority would be subject to 
state-bar discipline. 
The remedies for defendants victimized by coercive plea and sentence 
bargaining are not so clear-cut.  The audits must necessarily occur well after 
the negotiation and most likely well after the defendants have begun serving 
their respective sentences.  Although pleas can be modified upon a finding of 
prosecutorial misconduct,229 sentences being served or already served cannot 
be undone.  Such concerns, however, should not detract from the larger goal of 
deterrence.  An independent, outside watchdog’s potential finding of abuse, 
coupled with the ethical and professional responsibilities under which 
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and Living in Indiana?, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 657, 663 (1990) (“[A] showing of ‘actual’ 
vindictiveness is necessary when there is a pre-trial decision to modify charges against a 
defendant.” (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982)). 
96 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:63 
prosecutors are compelled to act, should render the practice of overcharging to 
gain negotiating leverage—as in Alfred’s opening case—a relic of the past. 
 
 
 
 
